ROLL STABILIZATION OF WARSHIPS

BY

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ABSTRACT

The world's first successful active roll stabilization of a warship took place in I938 In the Royal Navy. This paper firstly examines the history of stabilization from that time, through World War II to the prescnt day, based on Royal Navy and U.S. Navy experience. The **operational requirmenrs, far stabilizers in the various ship types of present day navies** are **then discussed and the types of stabilizer systems availabie to meet the requirements of modern warships are described and mmparcd in terms of operational performance and cost-effectiveness.** Finally the paper looks to the future and suggests some different stabilization ideas which, although not new in themselves, may with the aid of modern technology, become practical **propositions and be successlulIy developed For future warship applications.**

Introduction

Unlike the merchant ship, whose role is to voyage uneventfully and **economically from port to post, the warship's role is** to **go to sea and to stay there, live there, and work there. This special role heightens the impact that wave-induced ship motions have on the overall effectiveness of a warship. It is therefore the operational requirements of various warship types and their size that govern both the degree of motion control that should be applied and the nature of the stabilizer system that should be employed. Heave, pitch and roll are the motions that most influence operational effectiveness and of these roll is usually of the greatest magnitude. Fortunately,** the forces that **induce roll are relatively small and it is practical to counteract these with a roll stabilizer device. Furthermore, having controlled roll, there is then scope to manoeuvre the ship** to reduce **and to optimize these two motions.**

There have been many studies and experiments in the past to reduce the other critical motions of pitch and heave by the direct application of counteracting moments and forces, the most recent example being the study of bow fins for the French Navy aircraft carrier *Charles* **de** *Guulle'.* **These have, however, all proved to be impracticable because of the very high powers and stresses involved. The discussion in this paper will therefore** be **confined to roll stablization in the historical context and that of the present day, but other degrees of** freedom **wit1 be** examined **in the context of future developments.**

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Several unsuccessful attempts were made to provide ships with roll **stabiliza**tion in the late nineteenth century, including such bizarre devices as gigantic flywheels and **girnballed** saloons, but it **was** not until **1935** that the first practical and successful system appeared in the Cross Channel steamer Isle of **Sork.** This was **an active** fin system designed and **developed** by Brown Brothers **and** Company Limited of Edinburgh in conjunction with Denny Brothers Ltd of Dumbarton and was the first of many hundreds of Denny-Brown stabilizers.

During this same period of the **late** 1930s the Admiralty developed a new class of **warship to** become known **as** anti-aircraft **sloops.** These ships, designed specifically to provide anti-aircraft **cover** for convoys, displaced l 190 tons and had a principal armament of **six** four-inch high-angle guns. The gun **fire** control system was somewhat rudimentary and based on goniographic principles with an unstabilized sight line. Following Admiralty involvement **in** trials on the Isle of Sark, it **was** decided to fit Denny-Brown stabilizers in the anti-aircraft sloops to improve their **gun** fire accuracy, commencing with H.M.S. *Bittern* in 1938. During the immense R.N. shipbuilding programme of the Second World War **over one** hundred sloops, frigates and destroyers were fitted with similar stabilizers. By the end of the Second World War developments in naval gunnery had led to tachometric fire control systems with their rate-measuring **gyros** simultaneousIy providing a very accurate stabilization of the sight line against roll, pitch and yaw **motions.** Thus the **gunnery** requirement to provide roll stabilization for the whole ship **was** diminished and stabilizers were no longer fitted in R.N. ships.

The Denny-Brown stabilizers of the Second **World War era had fins of** about **2** square **metres** in area and a high aspect ratio of about 2.1. **They** were **of** the retractable type which could be withdrawn athwartships into the hull when not in use, and were thus protected when the ship berthed alongside. During the late **1940s** and early **1950s** these stabilizers virtually disappeared **from** the British **Fleet,** the notable exception still giving good service today being those fitted in H.M.Y. **Britannia.**

It **was** not until the advent **of** the naval helicopter and the requirement to use it in an anti-submarine (ASW) role from small ships that the roll stabilizer made **its** re-appearance, this time as an aid to naval aviation. The **COUNTY** Class guided missile destroyers were built with three pairs of active fins each, the **LEANDER** Class frigates with **one** pair, whilst the Type 12 frigates were retrofitted with **one** pair each **and** no less than **five** pairs were used **when H.M.S.** *Hake* converted **to** a helicopter cruiser. Since that time all combatant ships for the R.N. have **been** designed with fin stabilizers from the outset.

During this **second** era a **new** design of **fin was** introduced. The athwartships retractable type had always been vulnerable to damage from underwater shock **and** could **be** a considerable embarrassment if it jammed in the extended position. Thc **spacc** rcquircd for retraction within the ship **was** already more than the designers wished, and to strengthen this design for shock would have made it even less acceptable in terms of space requirement. The new design fin was non-retractable and driven by a **fin** shaft passing through a gland in the ship's hull. This is **now** the generic design of **fins** for warships and is illustrated in FIG. I.

This **fin** unit **can** be designed to the highest current **shock** standards, but because it cannut be retracted its outreach **must** be restricted to the docking line of the ship, if the ship is to berth alongside without damaging the fins. The **fin** aspect ratio is therefore very low, typically about **0.6:1,** and the trapezoidal shape was adopted to minimize as far as possible the adverse lift/area ratio caused by the low aspect ratio. It was the outreach limitations and consequent **iow** lift/area ratios that led to the multi-fin installations.

FIG. 1-TYPICAL NAVAL STABILIZER FIN UNIT (FIN NOT SHOWN IN LOWER VIEW)

Because of the large aircraft carrier force of the **U.S.** Navy, ASW helicopters **were** not introduced into small escort warships until much later **than** in the R.N. **FolIowjng** some unfortunate experiences with unreliable stabilizer systems in the DD 1052 class destroyers during the **1960s** there **was** considerable resistance **to fitting** any more in the **U.S. fleet. As** a result however of considerable **work** by Captain **James** Kehoe, U.S.N.,' and by Dr Juliana Gatzoulis and Mr Robert Keane,³ U.S. opinion swung in favour of fin stabilizers for the 70 ships of the **FFG** 7 class of frigates **with** their large **LAMPS** helicopters, which **were** built **in** the early **1980s.** This **active fin** stabilizer **system,** again **from** Brown Brothers and built to very **exacting U.S.** Navy standards, represent the 'best that **money** can buy' **and** sets the benchmark for sy **sterns** built to full military standards. Paradoxically however, by the time the FFG 7 stabilizer system completed development very few navies of **the** free world, other than the **U.S.N.,** could afford equipment built to such high standards due to rapid changes in the world economic climate.

PRESENT DAY

During the **1960s** and early **19713s most** countries **in** the free world enjoyed a fairly steady economic growth and the trend in the design of equipment for warships **was** the pursuit **of** excellence in performance and reliability, this resulted **in** increasing technical sophistication and a steady increase in unit purchase costs. With the world trade recession **that** followed the quadrupling of oil prices during the Arab-Israel War of 1974 **most nations** were forced τ to review and reduce their defence expenditure and it soon became clear to the naval authorities that future warships would have to be designed down **20** a cost and **every** feature of the new designs closely scrutinized for **cosi**effectiveness. **Thus** the **current situation** arose in which the naval requirement is not simply the best equipment regardless of cost, as typified **by** the **FFG 7** stabilizer system, but is **now** the best equipment available for a given cost.

Even with these economies in design many **of the smaller** nations realized that the true warship with its military features of high shock resistance, high speed and **low** noise characteristics **was** still too expensive and indeed too sophisticated for **their needs. Their** requirement **is** for coastal **defence** and offshore patrol, not an ocean **task** force. Thus was born the concept of the large Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV). These ships are usually in the range of 1200 to 1800 tonnes displacement, with full helicopter facilities, and reasonable power. They are, however, to commercial standards and lack the **shock,** speed and noise characteristics which contribute greatly to the high cost of the true warship.

Recognizing this **situation** Brown Brothers embarked on a **private** venture development programme for stabilizer **systems** for both **warships and OPVs** which would meet the changed requirements. **As** one **way** of reducing costs **whilst** retaining as **much** as possible of the previous high technical standards, they adopted a policy of 'complete system engineering' **in which** they **took** control of the design and manufacture **of** the whole system embracing sensors, electronic computation, power amplification, and the heavy mechanical actuation. **To** achieve this policy **they** set up their own Control System Division **whose** digital-based hardware and software products are marketed as Vickers Marine Controls **(VMC).** In re-examining **the** operational requirements Brown Brothers concluded that the essential ingredients for a stabilizer system **were** the stabilizer power or degree of stabilization achieved, the effect of ship's speed on stabilizer power, and the role of the ship.

Stabilizer Power

This is **usually defined in terms** of **'wave** slope capacity' **(WSC),** in which the maximum heeling moment provided by the stabilizer **system** is equated to the heeling moment that **would** be applied by the appropriate value of **wave** slope, and is therefore expressed in degrees. Obviously the WSC required to stabilize a 20 000 tonne aircraft carrier **in** Sea State **6 would** be **much** less than that for a 3000 tonne frigate in the **same** sea **state,** simply because the basic **disturbance of** the larger ship is much less in the first place. The stabilizer power specified for a **given class of** ship is somewhat subjective and should certainly vary with the role of the ship. For example, a case **may be made for** less stabilizer power in a ship **without** aviation facilities **than** for a ship of similar size which carries organic helicopters. For their private venture **work** therefore, for ships with organic **aviation** Brown Brothers have concluded in general **terns** that the values of stabilizer power given in **TABLE** I will **give** satisfactory cost-effective operation.

Ship Type	Displacement tonnes	Power (WSC) degrees
Aircraft Carrier	$20000 - 40000$	$2 - 3$
Cruiser	$8000 - 12000$	$3 - 4$
Frigate/Destroyer	$2000 - 5000$	$1 - 5$
OPV	$800 - 1800$	-1

TABLE I-Recornmended *values* **of stabilizer** *power*

Effect of Ships' Speed

In **accordance** with the **laws** of **hydrodynamics,** the lift generated by of the ship's speed, and therefore the wave slope capacity of a given installation will vary in the same manner. For this **reason** a stabilizer installation is designed for a specified service speed which for a warship is usually in the region 18 to 22 knots. The WSC is quoted for that speed and is that which will be **generated** with the **fins** at their **maximum** angle of **attack, which is usually 25' to 30'.** When the ship **exceeds** the service speed the stabilizer controller automatically reduces the applied fin angle according to the square law to maintain a constant value of WSC and prevent undue fatigue stressing of the fin unit. **When the ship reduces below the** service speed a reduction in the WSC is inevitable, and at very **low** speeds, say below 6 knots, the WSC is practically zero and the fins automatically zeroed **to** prevent them cycling from limit to limit with virtuaily no benefit. If however the **ship's** role includes slow speed operation, such as sonar array towing or minehunting, **some** other form of stabilization is required **that is independent of speed.**

Controlled Passive Tanks

Having examined and rejected the possibilities for active tank stabilizers⁴, **passive** tanks, and **moving** weights in modern warships, **Brown** Brothers pursued a compromise between the passive and active tanks systems to **control** the natural transfer of **fluid** through the **flume** (the Iink between the port **and starboard tanks) of a passive** system. This is illustrated in principle in FIG. 2. The motion of fluid is controlled by **opening** and closing butterfly valves to the airspace **above** the **fluid in** the tanks. By sensing the ship's roll angle velocity together with the instantaneous direction of fluid **flow** in the flume, the **stabiiizer** controller drives the **valves** so that the fluid motion

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opposes the roll by being in phase advance of it, ideally a phase
advance of 90° for optimum perfrequency formance. The response bandwidth of the controlled passive system is much greater than the purely passive and the additional weight and space requirements are negligible compared with an active tank system. Controlled passive tank systems are now in service in the R.N. seabed operations vessel, H.M.S. Challenger, and coastal survey vessels, and in the new mooring and salvage vessel of the **Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service** (RMAS).

FIG. 2-CONTROLLED TANK STABILIZER

The Performance of Fins and Tanks

The graph of Fro. 3 shows the roll response of a ship plotted against the frequency of roll disturbance of a sinusoidal form that approximates to Sea State 5. Without any form of stabilization the 'out to out' roll would be some 25° at the ship's natural frequency of 0.7 radians per second (roll period 9 seconds). If stabilized with controlled passive tanks as in Fig. 2, the roll would be reduced to about 8°, not only over the wide frequency spectrum illustrated, but also at any ship's speed down to zero. If in addition one pair of fin stabilizers were installed in the ship, a further reduction to something less than 2° would be achieved but only at speeds of 18 knots and above. At, say, 12 knots the roll would probably be 4 or 5° at the natural roll frequency. Below 6 knots the fins would make no contribution and be zeroed.

The Roles of Present Day Warships

For an aircraft carrier a **'fin** only' installation would **sufice,** although for *the Charles* **de** *Goulle* **considerable** augmentation **is** being considered.] Similarly **fins** alone should **suffice** for the AAW or ASW frigate with organic helicopters but no **towed** array. If however the ASW frigate has a primary role of array towing then a **combined fin** and tank installation would be more **satisfactov.** For a minehunter a 'tank only' installation **would** be most suitable. In the case of OPV there is no reason why the warship nonretractable stabilizers should not be fitted provided the ship's speed is high enough. Most OPV operating navies however do not have **a** Fleet **Air Arm** manned by experienced maritime aircrew and use Coastguard **or** even Army helicopters at sea. This necessitates a higher degree of stabilizer **power** as **suggested in TABLE I. Because the OPVs are normally IOW speed vessels** with service speeds no higher than 10 to 14 **knots** and maximum **speeds** rarely exceeding 20 **knots, the size of** non-retractable **fin** required to generate this power would be much too large for the ship.

The soIution available today is the **modern** version of **Denny-Brown** commercial stabilizer which is illustrated in **FIG.** 4. **Because the** fins are **folded** into the **hull** when **the** ship berths alongside, their outreach is virtually unlimited and a high aspect ratio can **be** employed. This design **also** facilitates the use of *a* **tail flap the effect** of which, combined with the high aspect ratio, results in highly efficient generation of lift. In general terms this design of **fin** is approximately **twice** as powerful as a non-retractable tsapezoidal **fin** of **rhe same area** and is thus very suitable far the **slow** speed **OPV** which does not have the military high **shock** requiremenc.

THE FUTURE

Rudder Roll Stabitization (RRS)

It has been known for **many** years that **the difference in natural response** frequency between the roll and **yaw** motions of a given ship is quite considerable and that in theory a single set of control surfaces can be used to provide both the steering and stabilizer functions. Considerable theoretical work was carried out in the 1970s^{5,6}, and in more recent times developments in the control systems field have furthered practical demonstrations of controlling this 'non-minimum phase' system^{7,8,9}, with the references quoted covering only a **small** portion of this work. These are **however areas in which** RRS has yet to be fully proven and **user** confidence established, particularly the dynamic performance of the machinery, **integrity** of **the system,** and modes of operation.

In considering dynamic **performance it must** be recognized that the **'rudders' must now operate** in the frequency regime of stabilizers, which is roughly **one** order higher than for steering. From the performance viewpoint, therefore, the equipment must be **to** stabilizer **standards. Indeed the description** 'Steer by Stabilizer' might be **more** accurate than RRS, it also emphasizes the fact that such stabilizers **must** be designed and buill to the integrity of steering **systems.** Because they are not essential for **sea-going** capability. current stabilizer systems are built with virtually no redundancies or facilities for manuaI or emergency control. The **new** combined system therefore **must** combine the dynamic performance of stabilizers with the integrity of steering, which **makes it** far more expensive than at first sight. It is also significant that, unlike stabilizers **which** act only as regulators correcting induced roll, **steering** systems must respond to steering orders as **well** as regulating against induced **yaw.** There **are** also **occasions** of close manoeuvring in warship

operations, such as Replenishment at Sea, when a **combination of manual** steering **with automatic stabilization** is **used** for **safety reasons, and** the **interactions of these two** motions in **differing modes will require considerable proving trials; for RRS.**

FIG. 4-FOLDING FIN STABILIZER

An interesting **soIution** to these problems is being adopted for the **Royal** Danish Navy's STANFLEX 300 Class, which has three propellers with a 'rudder', which is basically a stabilizer unit, behind each. This is illustrated in **FIG.** 5. In the **cruise** mode the outboard propellers only are used and **their** rudders **operated in RRS. In the high** speed mode **a11** three propellers are used but the centre rudder is operated for steering **only.** This arrangement **of** three independent units provides the **redundancy** required for **the** steering function and the facility to separate the functions when required to eliminate the possibility of interaction.

FIG. 5-THREE RUDDER RRS INSTALLATION

Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull Vessels (SWATH)

Considerable interest is *now* **being shown in SWATH** applications for **warships** such **as** illustrated in **FIG.** *6,* **The** attractive feature of this ship type is **its inherently low** reaction to **wave** motion which arises from the small **waterpIane area** and deep immersion of the pontoons. In broad terms it has been suggested that a SWATH displacing some 5000 tonnes would have about the **same** motion **as** a 20 000 tonne monohull in the same **sea state. This advantage is however offset** by the **low** self-righting effects. Following **exten**sive sea trials of a small experimental SWATH vessel by the **U.S. Navy, it** has been accepted that passive motion control is **insufficient** and that active control of roll, and particularly **of** pitch, must be adopted.

From their studies of this control problem **Brown** Brothers **suggest** a four fin configuration as in FIG. **6.** The after fins provide **the** basic pitch stability and are fixed. They are however provided with controllable tail flaps for the adjustment of trim which is required with **variation of wave** height. The forward **fins** are fuIly movable and, being driven independently, **can** control both the roll motion **and** the induced pitch variation. The steering **function** is quite separate and is provided **by** rudders, A SWATH **vessel** of about 3500 **tonnes** is currently **under** construction for the **U.S.** Navy and **will create** tremendous interest when the results of sea trials are available.

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FIG. **6-FIN CONFIGURATION FOR SWATH**

CONCLUSIONS

This review of fifty years of **ship** motion **control has indicated that whilst wave induced forces on warships have remained unchanged, the need for counteracting them and the technologies available** to **do so have been the subject** of **continuous change. Such changes will** continue **into the future and, far from being a closed** subject on which **everything is known,** the **problems of ship** motion **will** continue to **tax** the minds of **marine engineers as** long **as ships continue to go** to **sea.**

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