TY  - GEN
N2  - Known as Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), perpetrators employ electromagnetic sources to intentionally disrupt, deceive or damage electronic devices by broadcasting or injecting disturbance signals. Modern ships are vulnerable to IEMI as they increasingly rely on electronic devices for their power, control, communication, and navigation systems. The prolonged disruption of the Global Positioning System (GPS) would bring huge financial losses to the maritime sector, for example. Given the wide range of attack possibilities employing electromagnetic interference, this paper discusses and contrasts different IEMI threats for the maritime application, divided here into jamming, spoofing, and use of high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) sources. For the case of HPEM, this paper proposes a simplified model to estimate the field strength at targeted electronics part of ships for HPEM weapons located in vicinities. Finally, this paper also presents guidelines oriented for stakeholders in the maritime sector on how to increase the IEMI security level of their assets.
DO  - 10.24868/10723
DO  - doi
AB  - Known as Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), perpetrators employ electromagnetic sources to intentionally disrupt, deceive or damage electronic devices by broadcasting or injecting disturbance signals. Modern ships are vulnerable to IEMI as they increasingly rely on electronic devices for their power, control, communication, and navigation systems. The prolonged disruption of the Global Positioning System (GPS) would bring huge financial losses to the maritime sector, for example. Given the wide range of attack possibilities employing electromagnetic interference, this paper discusses and contrasts different IEMI threats for the maritime application, divided here into jamming, spoofing, and use of high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) sources. For the case of HPEM, this paper proposes a simplified model to estimate the field strength at targeted electronics part of ships for HPEM weapons located in vicinities. Finally, this paper also presents guidelines oriented for stakeholders in the maritime sector on how to increase the IEMI security level of their assets.
AD  - Fraunhofer INT
AD  - RH Marine
AD  - Fraunhofer INT
AD  - Fraunhofer INT
T1  - The Threat of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference to Maritime Vessels
DA  - 2022-09-26
AU  - Arduini, F
AU  - Van Der Ven, JK
AU  - Lanzrath, M
AU  - Suhrke, M
L1  - https://library.imarest.org/record/10723/files/10723.pdf
JF  - Conference Proceedings of iSCSS
VL  - iSCSS 2022
PY  - 2022-09-26
ID  - 10723
L4  - https://library.imarest.org/record/10723/files/10723.pdf
KW  - IEMI
KW  - Security
KW  - Jamming
KW  - Spoofing
KW  - HPEM
KW  - Maritime Vessels
KW  - Ships
KW  - Critical Infrastructure
TI  - The Threat of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference to Maritime Vessels
Y1  - 2022-09-26
L2  - https://library.imarest.org/record/10723/files/10723.pdf
LK  - https://www.imarest.org/events/category/categories/imarest-event/international-ship-control-systems-symposium-2022
LK  - https://library.imarest.org/record/10723/files/10723.pdf
UR  - https://www.imarest.org/events/category/categories/imarest-event/international-ship-control-systems-symposium-2022
UR  - https://library.imarest.org/record/10723/files/10723.pdf
ER  -